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4.  The Degree of Consolidation in Financial Supervision: the FAC Index 
 
If, therefore, we wish to consider the financial supervision regime as an endogenous variable, the 
first problem is to construct this variable. The question is: How to "measure" the degree of 
concentration of financial powers59?  
 
To this end we attempted to construct a Financial Authorities Concentration Index ( FAC Index)60. 
The creation of the index is based on an analysis of which and how many authorities in 69 
countries are empowered to supervise the three traditional sectors of financial activity: banking, 
securities markets, insurance61.  
 
In Table 2, the initials have the following meaning:  B = authority specialized in the banking 
sector; I = authority specialized in the insurance sector; S = authority specialized in the securities 
markets; U = single authority for all sectors ; BS = authority specialized in the banking sector and 
securities markets; BI = authority specialized in the banking sector and insurance sector;  CB = 
central bank SI = authority specialized in the insurance sector and securities markets; 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2: SUPERVISION AUTHORITIES IN 69 COUNTRIES (year 2003) 
 
 
 Countries 
Banking 
Sector (b) 
Securities 
Sector (s) 
Insurance 
Sector (i) Rating Weight 
FAC 
INDEX 
1 Albania CB S I 1 0 1 
2 Argentina CB S S 1 0 1 
3 Australia BI BI,S BI 7 -1 6 
4 Austria U U U 7 0 7 
5 Belarus CB S I  1 0 1 
6 Belgium BS BS I  5 0 5 
7 Bosnia CB,B1,B2 S I 1 -1 0 
                                                 
59 The consolidation process of the financial supervision powers cannot be described using a discrete variable (Single 
Authority or not). De Luna Martinez and Rose (2001) correctly claim that also in the group of integrated supervisory 
agencies is not homogeneous as it seems. 
60 See Masciandaro (2003). 
61 Sources: see  Masciandaro (2003). The information are updated to the 2003. 
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8 Brazil CB S CB,I 1 1 2 
9 Bulgaria CB S I  1 0 1 
10 Canada BI Ss(**) BI 3 0 3 
11 Chile B SI SI  3 0 3 
12 Colombia BI S BI 3 0 3 
13 Croatia CB S I 1 0 1 
14 Cyprus CB S I 1 0 1 
15 Czech Republic CB  S I 1 0 1 
16 Denmark U U U 7 0 7 
17 Ecuador BI S BI 3 0 3 
18 Egypt BC S I 1 0 1 
19 Estonia U U U 7 0 7 
20 Finland BS BS I 5 0 5 
21 France BC,B1,B2,B3 BC,S I 1 -1+1 1 
22 Georgia CB S I 1 0 1 
23 Germany U U U 7 0 7 
24 Greece CB S I 1 0 1 
25 Hong Kong CB S I 1 0 1 
26 Hungary U U U 7 0 7 
27 Iceland U U U  7 0 7 
28 India CB,B S I 1 -1 0 
29 Ireland CB CB CB 7 0 7 
30 Israel CB S,I I 1 1 2 
31 Italy CB CB,S I 1 1 2 
32 Jamaica CB SI SI 3 0 3 
33 Japan U U U 7 0 7 
34 Jordan CB S I 1 0 1 
35 Latvia U U U 7 0 7 
36 Lithuania CB S I 1 0 1 
37 Luxembourg BS BS I 5 0 5 
38 Macedonia CB S - 1 0 1 
39 Malaysia CB S CB 3 0 3 
40 Malta U U U 7 0 7 
41 Mauritius CB SI SI 3 0 3 
42 Mexico BS BS I 5 0 5 
43 Moldova CB S - 1 0 1 
44 Netherlands CB CB,S I 1 1 2 
45 New Zealand CB S I 1 0 1 
46 Norway  U U U 7 0 7 
47 Pakistan CB CB,SI SI 3 1 4 
48 Peru BI S BI 3 0 3 
49 Philippines CB CB,S I 1 1 2 
50 Poland B B,S I1,I2 1 1-1 1 
51 Portugal CB CB,S I 1 1 2 
52 Romania CB S I 1 0 1 
53 Russia CB S I 1 0 1 
54 Singapore CB CB CB 7 0 7 
55 Slovak Republic CB SI SI 3 -1 2 
56 Slovenia CB S I 1 0 1 
57 South Africa CB SI  SI  3 0 3 
58 South Korea U U U 7 0 7 
59 Spain CB.Bs(**) CB,S I 1 1-1 1 
60 Sri Lanka CB S I 1 0 1 
61 Sweden U U U 7 0 7 
62 Switzerland BS BS I 5 0 5 
63 Thailand CB S I 1 0 1 
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Trinidad and 
Tobago CB S I 1 0 1 
65 Tunisia CB S I 1 0 1 
66 Turkey B G I 1 0 1 
67 UK U U U 7 0 7 
69 Ukraine CB S - 1 0 1 
69 USA CB,B S,Ss** I,Is(**) 1 -1 0 
 
(*) (b)= banking or central banking law; (s)= security markets law; (i)= insurance law 
(**) = state or regional agencies 
 
Then, to transform the qualitative information into quantitative indications, to gauge the degree of 
consolidation of each specific model of national supervision, we assigned a numerical value to 
each type of authority, according to the following scale: 
  
7 = Single authority for all three sectors (total number of supervisors=1) 
5 = Single authority for the banking sector and securities markets (total number of supervisors=2) 
3 = Single authority for the insurance sector and the securities markets, or for the insurance sector 
and the banking sector (total number of supervisors=2) 
1 = Independent specialized authority  for each sector (total number of supervisors=3) 
 
The rationale with which we assigned the values considers the concept of concentration of  
supervisory powers: the greater the concentration, the higher the index value.  
 
We elected to assign a value of 5 to the single supervisor for the banking sector and securities 
markets because of the predominant importance of banking intermediation and securities markets 
over insurance in every  national financial industry. It also interesting to note that, in the group of 
integrated supervisory agencies countries, it seems to be a higher degree of integration between 
banking and securities supervision than between banking and insurance supervision62; therefore, 
the degree of concentration of powers is, ceteris paribus, greater63. 
 
These observations do not, however, weigh another qualitative characteristic that emerges from 
Table 1: there are countries in which one sector is supervised by more than one  authority.  
 
It is likely that, other conditions being equal, when two control authorities exist in a given sector, 
and one of which has other powers in a second sector, the degree of concentration of power is 
greater. When, on the other hand, there are two control authorities in a given sector, neither of 
which has other powers in a second sector, the degree of concentration is diminished, because the 
total number of supervisors increases. 
 
It would therefore seem advisable to include these aspects in evaluating the various national 
supervisory structures by modifying the index as follows: 
· adding 1 if in the country there is at least one sector with two authorities assigned to 
supervision, and one of these authorities is also responsible for at least one other sector; 
                                                 
62 De Luna Martinez and Rose (2001). 
63 Alternatively, we  propose an index (FAC Two) according to the following scale: 5 = Single authority for all three 
sectors (total number of supervisors=1); 3 = Single authority for two sectors (total number of supervisors=2); 1 = 
Independent specialized authority  for each sector (total number of supervisors=3). As we will shown in Section 7, the 
econometric performances of  the two indices (FAC and FAC Two) are quite similar. 
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· subtracting 1 if in the country there is at least one sector with two authorities assigned to 
supervision, but none of these authorities has responsibility for another sector; 
· 0 elsewhere  
 
Lastly, there are three qualitative characteristics of supervision models that we decided not to 
consider in constructing this index. 
 
Firstly, we do not consider the nature of the authorities involved in the financial supervision 
setting. In particular,  in several countries it is the central bank -  i.e. the authority responsible for 
monetary policy -  that is responsible for at least one of the three sectors considered, typically the 
supervision and control of the banking industry. The attribution of supervisory power to the central 
bank has been at the centre of an intense theoretical and institutional debate over the past decade64, 
which in analogy with the problem discussed here has come to no general conclusions, perhaps for 
the same methodological reasons illustrated earlier.  
 
Furthermore, we do not consider the legal nature – public or private – of the supervisory agencies, 
nor their relationships with the political system (degree of independence, level of accountability, 
and so on). 
 
We therefore decided to construct an index that captures the degree of concentration of financial 
supervisory power regardless of the nature of the institutions involved in this process, i.e. stressing 
the importance of the pure number of supervisors involved. We will consider the role of the nature 
of the authorities later on, when we shall deal with the role of the central bank in the overall 
architecture of financial controls 65. 
 
Secondly, at least in each industrial country, there is an authority to protect competition and the 
market, with duties that impinge on the financial sectors. But, since it is a factor common to all the 
structures, we decided not to take the antitrust powers into account in constructing the index66.  
 
Finally, the financial authorities can perform different functions in the regulatory as well as in the 
supervisory area67.  However, at this first stage of the institutional analysis, we prefer to consider 
just the number of the agencies involved in the supervisory activities.  The FAC Index for the 69  
countries is shown in Table 2.  
 
                                                 
64 See Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1992), Masciandaro (1993) and (1995), Tuya and Zamalloa (1994),  Di Giorgio and 
Di Noia  (1999), Bruni (2001). More recently, Garcia Herrero and del Rio (2003) analyzed the relationship between 
financial stability  and monetary policy design, finding that focusing the central bank objectives on price stability 
reduce the likelihood of instability, and that the same is true locating regulatory and supervisory responsibilities at the 
central bank. 
65 Barth, Nolle, Phumiwasana and Yago (2002) claim that the key issues for banking supervision are 1) whether there 
should be one or multiple supervisory authorities and 2) whether the central bank  should be involved in bank 
supervision. Here we use the same intuition to build up the two indices of  financial authorities consolidation. 
66 The relationship between competition policies and stability are examined in Carletti and Hartmann (2002). 
67 Llewellyn (2001) noted that the basic functions performed by  regulatory and supervisory agencies cover ten main 
areas. For our purposes , in order to separate supervision – i.e.  monitoring rules compliance – from regulation – i.e. 
rules setting with managerial discretion - it is possible to  distinguish  five supervision functions (prudential supervision 
of financial institutions; conduct of business supervision; administration of deposit insurance; market integrity; 
financial institutions crisis procedures) from four regulation functions: management of  the payment system; prudential 
regulation, conduct of business regulation,  liquidity management. Obviously, however, in different cases it’s non easy 
to do a clear cut between supervision and regulation; on this point of view it is paradigmatic the overlapping between 
liquidity management and crisis procedures. 
